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"...with the entry into force of this treaty, the soldiers
of the former National People's Army become soldiers of the
? ....Bundeswehr." Of the challenges posed by German unification in
October 1990 and beyond, perhaps the most interesting is that
contained in this simple sentence nestled amid the hundreds of
pages and tens of thousands of details of the second unity
treaty. German soldiers of east and west, who previously served
in two armies, allied to two antagonistic ideological and
military blocks, now are on duty side-by-side within a single
army, within a single country and a single alliance. The ranks of
a transformed Bundeswehr now include men and women who have begun
to put aside an ideological and military antagonism that shaped
the second half of the twentieth century, and which seemed before
1989 as if it would go on much longer still.
This military aspect of the German revolution and subsequent
unification only makes full sense, however, with a careful
understanding of the intellectual-political foundations of the
German armed forces, which forms the subject of the present
essay. This understanding in turn requires a balanced reflection
on the past of the German soldier and his role in the changing
forms of state and politics in the Germany of the past three
centuries. The perspective afforded by past successes and
failures enables the soldiers of a United Germany to address the
extraordinary tasks of unification that stand before them. German
soldiers must tackle these challenges while the world struggles
to create a new international system of states and Europe
searches for a new and durable security order.
The peaceful and bloodless German unification of 1989-1990
naturally compelled many observers to reflect on a similar, yet
distinctly different course of events in 1870-1871. For
generations of Germans raised in the Borussian school of
Prussian-German history, the unification of the empire in 1871
was embodied in the heroic canvas of the Prussian academician,
Anton von Werner. His Proclamation of the German Reich, set in
the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles, existed in various versions
painted from 1877 until 1885. The artist depicted the moment in
which Bismarck has just finished reading the statement
establishing the empire and the assembled officers and officials
respond to the call of the Grand Duke of Baden for three cheers
for the new Emperor William I. The ensigns behind William lift
high the battle flags and standards of their regiments; the
officers and officials beneath William raise their spiked and
plumed helmets and sabers towards the ceiling as they cheer. As
Paret writes of this painting, "unification and the empire were
announced in enemy country, with the ceremonial trappings of war.
The new state was born on the battlefield, a fact and an image
that were to remain powerful in the history of the empire to the
day of its dissolution." German unity of the nineteenth century
and the course of statecraft that followed this event were
closely linked to the fortunes of the professional soldier and
his place in society.
The events of 9 November 1989 and 3 October 1990 await the
equivalent to Anton von Werner's canvas. In our time of a
cultural atomization and a splintered, post-modern aesthetic one
has difficulty imagining a single pictorial image that would
signify German unity, be it the denim-clad young people joyously
hacking out pieces of the wall in front of the Brandenburg Gate
on the night of 9 November 1989 or the "Ossies" in their Trabants
roaring through the new crossing points in clouds of two-cycle
smoke. But one thing is certain: whatever the future mythical,
artistic representation of these events, they will contain no
white and black battle standards of the Prussian regiments and
the red Lampassen of Prussian generals. This is to say, the
course of diplomacy and statecraft that fostered Prussian-German
unity after the wars of unification in 1864-1871 stands in stark
contrast to the bloodless and peaceful statecraft and strategy
that led to unification in 1989-1990. Soldiers in uniform were
nowhere to be seen in front of the Reichstag as the German black-
red-gold flag was hoisted on the mast at midnight and President
Richard von Weizsaecker read the new preamble to the German Basic
Law. Nor did there follow, as Erich Honecker had often warned in
his glory days, a victory parade of the Bundeswehr through the
Brandenburg Gate and up the Linden along a path conquering armies
had so often followed in the Prussian-German past.
Rather than a march of triumph along the route of the former
guard regiments, the arrival of the Bundeswehr in the five new
federal states took place in near silence or was accompanied in
its loudest form by the music of German classicism played at a
sober and low-key ceremony in the former East German Ministry of
Defense in Strausberg. But more remarkable than any display of
martial pomp were a series of seminars, discussions and lectures
between German soldiers from east and west that began some weeks
before 3 October 1990 and proceeded for several months
thereafter. In these encounters between what was now called
Bundeswehr-West and Bundeswehr-East, all concerned placed due
emphasis on the guiding principles of Innere Fuehrung and
Staatsbuerger m Uniform. These ideals, that encapsulate the
spirit and heart of the Bundeswehr, emerged in the wake of
Germany' s military defeat and the beginnings of the Federal
Republic in the early nineteen-f if ties and were long surrounded
by political controversy in the years of trial and final success
that followed until the nineteen-seventies. Innere Fuehrung and
Staatsbuerger in Uniform stand for the intellectual-political
foundation stones of the inner structure of the German military.
The evolution of these terms is explored briefly in the following
lines that examine the need to integrate the professional soldier
into German state and society.
*****
As the Bundeswehr slowly appeared in the mid-nineteen-
f if ties, Dr. Richard Jaeger (Christian Social Union), a leading
member of Parliament and an architect of the new army, summed up
a deep trauma of the German past: "Germany had in the past a good
army. Today we doubtless have the start and development of a good
democracy. But we in Germany have never had at the same time a
good army, a good democracy, and a balanced relationship between
the two." The makers of policy in the young Federal Republic
struggled to understand how previous German attempts at democracy
had come to such grief. Professional soldiers, long celebrated
before 1945 as nation builders and as ideals of character and
virtue, seemed especially guilty from the vantage point of the
two lost wars. The architects of West German democracy—most of
whom had served in the army--recalled vividly the civil-military
antagonism of Prussian-German history that so often had placed
soldiers and democrats on opposite sides of the barricades. The
founders of the Bundeswehr, men and women from all walks of life,
reflected on the course of Prussian-German history, and believed
that the ethos of the professional soldier had too often stood in
conflict with the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity
that swept Europe and America after 1789. The Federal Republic,
faced in the early cold war with the prospect of reshaping the
ethos and self-image of the soldier, would have to strike an
almost magical balance between the principles of freedom and the
requirements of military service.
As one looked back over the century and beyond, the
professional soldiers of the past offered a disappointing record.
Increasingly closed off from other social groups in the course of
the nineteenth century, Prussian-German officers appeared to
contemporary liberal and socialist critics as nurturing a world
view in conflict with Germans beyond the barracks and the
officers' mess. The professional officer all too often saw
himself as the heir to medieval chivalry, whose values of honor,
dash, and cold bloodedness under fire were to be handed down to
succeeding generations. Too many professional soldiers,
confronted with the turbulence of mass politics and the struggle
for a widening of political participation in the late nineteenth
century, celebrated their concept of honor at the expense of
other civic virtues and social groups.
This civil-military conflict, though first present as far
back as the era of revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare, emerged
in its modern form amid the turbulence of the Wilhelmine fin de
8 •
siecle. Imperial Germany struggled with the political and social
effects of mass politics and the industrialization of German
life, all of which after 1880 transformed the nature of war and
armies. No longer was soldiering simply a calling for an armed
elite based upon noble blood-lines and the imperatives of
character. War was to become the business of a technocratic corps
in control of mass armies relying on metal and coal sinews of
war. Quite simply, the problem that confronted German
professional soldiers—as indeed it did others in Europe of the
time--was how to adjust the life and character of their
institution to the altered politics and society of the early 20th
century. Liberal, democratic and socialist forces, for their
part, had to find some way to strike a balance between the
imperatives of military effectiveness and the requirements of
pluralistic and democratic mass politics. Figures from liberal
and socialist parties—taking a clue from the era of Prussian
reform—suggested that the soldier in Imperial Germany should
become more of a citizen in uniform. Their sense of service,
military discipline and professional ethos should coincide with
the requirements of modern and enlightened society that required
not pliant and obedient subjects, but thinking and active
9
citizens. The Wilhelmine state, however, allowed for little such
compromise, a situation that only became far more disastrous with
the outbreak of war in 1914 and the defeat and revolution in
1918.
Tragically enough, when events seemed to indicate that
Germany might at last overcome this traditional civil-military
impasse, the first German republic failed to make peace between
soldiers and democrats. Despite the turbulence of revolution and
civil war, the spirit of the old professional soldier carried
over into the young republic. Parliamentarians for their part
never effectively revived pre-1914 initiatives to re-fashion
military professionalism suitable to the republic. Soldiers,
unyielding in the face of defeat, bloodied by civil-war and
hamstrung by the dictates of the Versailles Treaty, retreated
into a cult of tradition that became a substitute for integration
into civil state and society. The Reichswehr in its first years
of existence in the middle-nineteen twenties exalted the memory
of the monarchy and the old armies. This tendency fostered the
rise of the apolitical soldier, who imagined himself to be above
party politics and to embody the timeless virtues of a Prussian-
German state hardened by the trial of total war. Military
professionalism focused ever more on the handicraft of war, which
itself offered the enemies of Versailles the means to restore
German national honor sullied by defeat and the dictated peace.
The sum of these phenomena made the Reichswehr appear to its
critics as a "state within a state/' a phrase that fails to
describe the full reality of the German military between 1919 and
1933; nonetheless, this idea was to become a standard feature of
political debate about the soldier in the German slate for
decades to come.
The role of the soldier in National Socialism defies easy
generalizations and the quick interpretation required of this
kind of essay. Yet an understanding of this era of German
military history is an essential condition for any attempt to
understand the challenges that now face the Bundeswehr. Even a
half -century after the events, statements about the political
guilt of the professional soldier in the Third Reich excite
strong feelings and controversy. Once the Nazis came to power
in 1933, they had to harness the army. They too feared it as a
"state within a state," but needed it to assure their survival in
the state, to break the shackles of Versailles and re-establish
Germany as a great power
—
goals that lay at the center of
Hitler's program. Toward these ends, the Nazis tried to
infiltrate and manipulate the military in the first years of the
regime. This integration of the Reichswehr into the Nazi state
produced mixed results of success and failure during the six
years before the outbreak of war in 1939. In some sense,
professional soldiers and the Nazis shared similar revisionist
and nationalist ends, although the politically conservative, and
at times plainly naive officer corps failed to appreciate fully
the depths of Hitler's ambition and the ruthlessness of his
methods. The Day of Potsdam in March 1933, when Hitler appeared
to the officer corps as guardian of the Prussian-German military
heritage, camouflaged the radical and ultimately nihilistic
purposes of the Nazi regime. The Nazi statecraft and strategy of
the following years steadily gained momentum towards the abyss;
men in brown and field-grey re-armed the Reich and drove onward
to war and conquest. Despite the enormous bravery and self-
sacrifice of millions of Germans in World War II, who fought out
of a sense of honor and duty for what they regarded as a just
cause, there were many professional soldiers who identified with
the pernicious aims of National Socialism and aided Adolf Hitler
in his ideological wars of annihilation, particularly in the
eastern and Balkan campaigns. While many soldiers offered partial
or outright resistance to Nazi outrages, others joined in them as
little more than executioners. Certain individuals and units of
the German armed forces performed brilliantly in the tactical and
operational spheres on widely dispersed fronts, thus setting
extraordinary examples of military genius and operational art.
Others became accomplices in unspeakable atrocities that sullied
the record of the German soldier until the present day. For the
majority of soldiers, however—that is, the many millions who
served in the Wehrmacht through no choice of their own-
soldiering was at best a necessary evil; once the course of the
war turned against Germany, many soldiers fought for no other
reason than to protect themselves and their loved ones.
The disaster of a second defeat, and the revelations of
genocidal outrages that followed in its wake, appeared to seal
the fate of the German soldier he was to vanish along with so
much else that now seemed wrong and outdated in the despair of
the zero hour. But within the brief time of a few years, the
antagonism between the opposing ideological blocks led to the
armament of the two German states. Suddenly, in a manner that few
war-weary and exhausted Germans wished to confront, the makers of
policy in East and West had to devise a means to integrate the
soldier into the new states of east and west. The following lines
describe the character of the West German military experience.
*****
The generation of men and women in the Federal Republic who
responded to the call of the early nineteen-f if ties for a
balanced relationship between the soldier and democracy took the
Basic Law of 1949 as their point of departure. The
constitutional authors intended their work to answer the
democratic failures of the German past. Despite the troubled and
uncertain beginnings of the Basic Law in 1948-9, it has
nonetheless proved itself to be durable and effective; this
generalization applies equally to the Bundeswehr as it does to
the Federal Republic as a whole. The first lines of the Basic
Law, that is, Article 1, Paragraph One states that: "Human
dignity is untouchable. All state power is to protect and respect
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it." As the founders applied this principle to the new army on
the drawing boards of the early nineteen-f if ties, they conceived
of a soldier as a citizen in uniform. He was to be neither an
obedient subject of king and court, nor a politically blinkered,
military professional in service of an anti-liberal ideal of the
state; neither would he be an armed member of the racial
community in service of an ideology of teutonic supremacy, nor a
comrade in arms for class struggle and a world-wide workers'
revolution. Rather, the soldier of the Federal Republic was to
enjoy his inalienable civil rights while in uniform; the army
could only abridge these rights where military necessity
absolutely demanded it. But the new armed forces would be no
"democratic army." The founders never intended that soldiers
would first vote whether to storm a hill, as widespread American
misperception about Innere Fuehrung would have it; rather the
ideal here is of an "army in a democracy." The principles of the
Basic Law were to be transferred into the new military to check
past abuses of command and obedience and the chicanery of
everyday barracks life.
The civil-military challenge of the newly formed army
revealed three really rather daunting aspects: first, the
integration of a conscription army into the new German democracy;
secondly, the integration of the new armed forces into the
Atlantic Alliance; and finally, the creation of an inner
structure of the Bundeswehr that would accord with the principles
of the constitution. Just as the Basic Law has shown remarkable
strength in the face of challenges to German democracy from
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within and without, the three-fold integrationist imperative of
the Bundeswehr has been similarly effective and durable since
1955. This general capacity for integration, visible in the
ideals of Staatsbuerger in Uniform and Innere Fuehrung have shown
themselves in four major features of the Bundeswehr described
below. These four traditions of integration also bear greatly
on the character of the German soldier and German unity.
First, the founders of the Bundeswehr conceived of the army
as being purely defensive. It is limited in its mission by the
strictures of the military amendments to the Basic Law put in
hand under the Adenauer government in close cooperation with
parliament. The general insistence upon legal constraints on the
character and mission of the armed forces represents yet another
answer to the German military past. Never before had a German
constitution expressly limited the mission of the armed forces
solely to defense as laid down in Article 87a: "The Federation
establishes armed forces for defense." The Bundeswehr, further
integrated in its key command echelons and combat forces into a
multi-national entity of Atlantic Alliance, threatens none of
Germany's many neighbors. That is, not only does the law of the
land proscribe aggressive war, but the Germans on their own
cannot wage such a war because they share command and control of
their forces in the integrated Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) . 14
In the second instance of integration, Bundeswehr defends a
parliamentary democracy; in a direct sense it is nothing less
than army of the parliament itself. Members of parliament,
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working closely with members of other social groups, built the
army together with professional soldiers. The military
legislation drafted amid intense debate and anxiety in the mid-
1950s anchored the new army in the executive branch of
government, which in turn answers to parliament. The makers of
military policy in the Adenauer era thus succeeded where their
predecessors in the first republic had not—they established the
primacy of parliamentary policy over the military as the men and
women of the nineteen-twenties had plainly failed to do.
Outstanding among the mechanisms that assures this control are
the arrangements for the supreme command of the armed forces.
While such command had previously rested with the king and
emperor, the president of the republic, or the Fuehrer, the Bonn
parliamentarians placed it during peacetime with the Minister of
Defense; in crisis and war, then, the latter is to hand over
command to the Chancellor himself. To assure that the military
remains within the spirit and the letter of these principles, the
parliamentary fathers of the Bundeswehr established the
Wehrbeauftragter, as a kind of democratic protective angel for
the rank and file. He also reports to parliament annually on the
strength of the inner structure and the problems of military
life.
Closely connected with the preceding is the third tradition
of integration: the ideal of the citizen in uniform. While some
might dismiss this phrase as an empty public relations gesture,
it embodies an important reality that stands out from the record
of past and present armies in Germany and elsewhere. That is,
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there is no constitutional difference between a citizen in blue
denim or grey flannel and one in olive-drab or blue grey uniform.
From the very outset such founders of the Bundeswehr as Graf
Kielmansegg, Graf Baudissin and Ulrich de Maiziere, insisted that
the soldier on duty must experience daily the same liberal and
democratic values he has sworn to defend. Past opposition to the
military grew from the perceived mistreatment of the common
soldier by NCOs and officers, episodes made popular in such
novels as Erich Maria Remarque's All Quiet on the Wvstern Front
and Hans-Hellmut Kirst's 08/15. Innere Fuehrung, among its goals,
seeks to banish abuses contrary to human dignity.
Fourthly, and again closely linked with the above tradition,
the founders decided to draft young men to serve in the
Bundeswehr. The makers of policy took this step despite calls in
the nineteen-f if ties for a professional army; they did so to
underscore the principle that national defense stands among the
duties of every citizen. The draftees also further integrate the
military into society as they frustrate the rise of a caste
mentality so typical of professional armies. Officers and NCOs
encounter a constant stream of young civilians uninterested and
unimpressed by the cult of soldierly bravery; a fraction of these
young men then join the officer corps on an ongoing basis.
These traditions of integration anchor the German armed
forces within the dual spheres of domestic and international
politics. The primacy of parliamentary control over the military
complements the integration of the Bundeswehr into the Atlantic
Alliance. Just as colonels of Bonn's Ministry of Defense do not
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encircle parliament with Leopard II tanks to impose a decision on
the government, nor do they secretly draft war plans at SHAPE,
furtively move armored divisions to the border, nor launch
lightning campaigns to alter the central European balance of
power.
To speak in the nineteen-nineties of these principles of
integration as "traditions" of the Bundeswehr belies how long it
took to make these imperatives of policy into realities of every-
day life. From the early 'fifties until the nineteen-seventies,
the Bundeswehr stood under constant scrutiny from those fearful
of the dangers to freedom posed by its defenders. For two decades
critics worried that soldiers raised in the anti-democratic and
authoritarian schools of the old armies, the Reichswehr and the
Wehrmacht might never become good democrats. Would they not seize
their first chance to return to their old militarist ways as had
been the case in the Weimar Republic? One should recall as well
that the Bundeswehr reformers of the first generation were
veterans of these same armies. Their past notwithstanding, they
fully recognized the imperative for change imposed by altered
political circumstances. Their laudable efforts at military
reform between 1955 and 1970 were accompanied by occasional
scandals about the accidental deaths of soldiers in training and
rumblings about the existence of a counter-reformation in the
military leadership. Observers outside the military of the
nineteen-sixties worried that, despite the appearance of reform,
there lurked within the ranks a corps of militarists for whom the
ideal of the citizen in uniform and Innere Fuehrung had merely
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been a mask to sell the new army to its critics. At a fateful
moment this group might cast off the mask of reform to reveal the
old face of Prussian-German militarism. But even in the
turbulence of late nineteen-sixties these fears remained
groundless. The Bonn Republic proved itself stronger and luckier
than its Weimar predecessor for many reasons, not the least
because the mechanisms of military integration worked effectively
in the transition from the Konrad Adenauer-Ludwig Erhard era to
that of Willy Brandt-Helmut Schmidt.
By the nineteen-eighties, these foundation stones of the
inner structure of the Bundeswehr seemed to have stood the test
of time. The anxieties and fears about a militarist revival in
the first decades of the Bundeswehr faded into memory. To be
sure, episodes of controversy about NATO strategy confronted the
West German armed forces with the deployment of the INF missiles
in 1982-4 and with the debate about the Follow-on-to-Lance
missile in early 1989. But in the rhetoric that accompanied these
events, one did not hear much about the integration of the army
into society. The European diplomatic revolution of 1989-199C,
however, suddenly and radically transformed military affairs in
Germany. The Bundeswehr stood at the turn of the year 1990-1, as
Minister of Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg said, before the greatest
challenge since its creation in 1955: it must integrate the
soldiers of the former National People's Army into its ranks
while simultaneously reducing and reorganizing itself to fit the
altered political-military landscape of a uniting Europe.
*****
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The challenge posed by the soldiers of Bundeswehr-East fits
within the grander integration of the soldier and the state in
the German past. There can be little doubt that the phenomenon of
one army connected to one multi-national alliance absorbing the
soldiers of another army allied to an opposing block forms a
unique chapter in the record of European armies in the modern
era. For anyone who has been an eyewitness to this process, as is
this writer, the entire event is extraordinary. But putting aside
all sense of shock with the new, one should see more continuity
in this process than discontinuity; that, indeed, German military
unification of 1989/90 exists in a continuum that reaches back at
least to the era of Prussian military reform in the early
nineteenth century and has passed through several changes of
political regime in Germany. Put another way, there is a kind of
continuity in change even in this case. This statement fully
recognizes the extraordinary hurdles that stand in the way of the
present challenge of Bundeswehr-West and Bundeswehr-Ost; such
integration is plainly difficult, not the least because of the
important political-intellectual differences between the two
armies considered in the following lines.
Each German state after 1949 attempted in its own way to
anchor the professional soldier within the civil-military
institutions of its form of government. The previous pages
suggested the reasons for success in West Germany. In the case of
the now vanished German Democratic Republic, the masters of state
and society in the Socialist Unity Party ( SED) of the nineteen-
17
fifties and nineteen-sixties imposed "Stalinist structures of
1 7power" on the armed forces. The foregoing statement does not
dismiss the National People's Army as "the malevolent instrument
18 • <
of an unjust state"; but it is no less true that first the
Soviet occupiers and later the leaders of the Socialist Unity
Party built the inner structure of the military and linked it in
turn with other organs of party and state power, all of which
strikes the observer of today as if taken from the pages of
George Orwell's Nineteen-Eighty-Four, While the SED integrated
the NVA into the state and alliance by certain structures that
might superficially resemble those of the West German case, the
spirit of the East German military and its concept of discipline
stood in obvious contradiction to the first lines of the West
1 QGerman Basic Law as regards the inviolability of human dignity.
By means of "ideological indoctrination, the screening out
of all free information, the rigid integration into the party,
which itself imposed strict discipline, and through political
surveillance," the SED made the army its own. Outstanding was
the ideal of blind obedience to party and state. An exhaustive
description of the political and military organizations of the
GDR would overwhelm the present essay, but suffice it to say
that, for reasons of conviction or self-advancement, fully 98% of
the officer corps joined the SED. These men were further linked
to the will of the SED through the network of political officers
of the Central Political Administration ( PHV) at various echelons
of command as well as by representatives of the party itself, of
the Free German Youth ( FDJ) and even the Ministry of State
18
Security (MfS) .
To this "Stalinist inner-structure" at the heart of the NVA,
the regime further added a kind of hybrid Prussian-German face,
visible, for instance, in the earth-grey uniformed soldiers on
parade before the Neue Wache and the Zeughaus on the Linden in
Berlin. Whereas the Federal Republic and the Bundeswehr eschewed
the military pomp of silver braid, jack boots, and brass bands in
favor of the ideal of an "army without pathos," the NVA used the
external trappings of military tradition to integrate the soldier
99 . . ....in the state. This use of traditional militaria in fact
perverted the Prussian-German military heritage, which never
embraced an ideal of total political control; in this sense, the
SED employed the artifice of tradition not unlike the Nazis, who
grafted a totalitarian ideology onto the cult of the soldierly
heritage. Such a familiar Prussian-German face may have sought to
foster a well-known image of the soldier in the state to the
average citizen of the GDR. But from the start, east Germans took
little joy in soldiering, and, as the decades passed and the
strength of the regime decayed with the advent of reform in the
Soviet Union in the mid-nineteen eighties, the average citizen
resented ever more the burdens of national security on everyday
life.
This growing popular anger with the leviathan of state power
overwhelmed the self-defeating hypertrophy of SED control in the
breathtaking events from the summer of 1989 until the spriny of
1990. The hybrid Stalinist/ Prussian-German inner structure of the
NVA had grown enfeebled and dilapidated like the party and state
19
that it defended; and like the ossified party leadership, the
forbidding border fortifications, and the rusting industrial
plants, this military inner-structure began to collapse during
the turn of the year 1989-1990. J As the inner structure of the
NVA fell, it shattered the world of beliefs and the ideals of
service that had motivated professional soldiers to take up arms
against NATO; these events left the majority of such men dazed
and paralyzed, while others remained defiant and proud.
The progress of revolution in the GDR also fostered the
first signs of democratic reform within the shaken NVA. At key
moments in the autumn of 1989, certain soldiers wisely resisted
orders to join in preparations to put down the revolution.
Seizing upon this lead from the ranks, reform circles began in
December 1989 under the Hans Modrow government to free the
military from the grip of the SED. Through the spring of 1990,
members of the round tables in the GDR drafted reforms to key
aspects of military life, borrowing heavily from the West German
principles of Innere Fuehrung and Staatsbuerger in Uniform.
This process also led within a matter of weeks to the first semi-
official and official contacts between the Bundeswehr and NVA;
these encounters between officers, NCO and soldiers of all kinds
grew through the summer and fall of 1990. They gained in
intensity once Helmut Kohl and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that a
united Germany could remain in NATO and the combined strength of
a united German military would fall to 370,000 by 1994. The
theory and practice of Innere Fuehrung loomed large in these
exchanges between soldiers of a uniting Germany.
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The climax of this process of military " pre-unif ication"
came at the ceremonies in Strausberg on 2, 3 and 4 October. On
the 2nd, Minister of Defense and Disarmament, Rainer Eppelman
lowered the flag of the German Democratic Republic and the NVA
went out of existence, while the following day, Minister of
Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg and Lieutenant General Joerg
Schoenbohm assumed command of the 100,000 soldiers of the former
NVA. Not all of these men would remain in the ranks at the end of
the disarmament that is to last until 1994; some would give up
military life out of disgust; some would go because their present
beliefs or past actions disqualified them to serve in a military
founded on the Basic Law. But a fraction of the veterans of the
NVA had every right to continue as soldiers, not the least
because they deserved a chance to adapt to the ideals of the
2 5German Basic Law and the self-image of the Bundeswehr. Those
who wanted to stay would undergo a probationary period and the
officers would have to pass the review of an independent
personnel screening committee.
An appreciation of the full gamut of problems connected with
the military union of Germany would overwhelm the remainder of
this essay, but as a commentator in a semi-official publication
of the Bundeswehr wrote in November, 1990, this task was "more of
an intellectual-psychological challenge than one of
2 ftorganization." That is, the architects of military unity on
Bonn's Hardthoehe might quickly draft a series of new wiring
diagrams and dispatch liaison officers to join the forces and
facilities of the vanished NVA/Bundeswehr-Ost with Bundeswehr-
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West, but the union of mentality, ethos and self-image of
professional soldiers from east and west would obviously require
more time and much human effort. This task was made no easier by
the disarmament agreed upon in the second half of 1990. Such
diplomacy required that a large fraction of professional officers
on duty on 3 October 1990 must become civilians within eighteen
months
.
Above all else, the process of union and the eradication of
all "inner walls," to use the phrase of President Richard von
Weizsaecker, demanded care and understanding from those of
Bundeswehr-West as regards the psychological and ethical
situation of the soldiers of the former NVA. "Nearly all my
comrades and I," as one east German described his state of mind
in the weeks before 3 October, "honestly believed that we served
the people of the GDR as well as peace. It was and is a very
painful realization for us that for all these years of military
duty, we trusted a leadership that revealed itself as corrupt and
incapable of guiding and leading this state. Many have fallen
apart as a result of this bitter realization and see no way out
of this situation; they are either resigned [ to their fate] or
71have given up.
"
Among the most troublesome consequences of this bitter
realization is an apparent antagonism to civilian control of the
military. While the first German-German military seminars in the
weeks before unification revealed that soldiers from east and
west had much in common as human beings, an intense discussion of
the ideals of Irmere Fuehrung pointed to profound political and
22
social differences. These uncommon aspects showed themselves in
the spiritual and ethical scars of cynicism and mistrust left
behind in NVA veterans damaged by the SED system of total
TO
political control.
In one instance witnessed by this writer, a discussion
between west and east German soldiers about the relationship of
the Bundeswehr to political life—many soldiers are elected to
serve in local government--prompted a forthright east German to
comment that the military should have nothing to do with politics
and politicians; soldiers should concentrate on the professional
aspects of their craft, free of outside interference. Such
sentiments, of course, have rich antecedents not only in the
German past; they recall the ban of 1875 in the Prussian army
against membership in political parties and the ideal of the
apolitical soldier in the Reichswehr. Such an apolitical
attitude, no doubt connected with the past abuses of the SED,
collides with the ideal and practice of the "citizen in uniform."
West German soldiers strive to participate in political life as
normal citizens. They are anything but a separate and exalted
warrior caste that embodies the state above special interests.
Such incidents as the above require officers from Bundeswehr-West
to do far more than merely explain the principles of Innere
Fuehrung in a classroom or over a glass of beer. They must help
the soldiers of Bundeswehr-Ost experience the ideals and practice
of West German military reform over an extended period of time
until these ideals assume a life of their own. Innere Fuehrung by
its very nature is not something to be memorized or recited on
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command.
But the military union posed a danger that, despite de jure
equality between soldiers of east and west, the Bundeswehr might
cleave into two groups for years to come: the self-confident
soldiers of Bundeswehr-West versus those of the shaken and
anxious Bundeswehr-Ost. The latter group, eager to remain
soldiers, might remain second class soldiers in their own eyes
and those of their West German peers. Having seen themselves
forced by circumstances to give up old patterns of thought and
behavior under the trauma of revolution, unity and military
probation, their sole imperative is to adapt as quickly as
possible to the political, legal and ethical world of the
Bundeswehr. As with other reductions in force in modern armies,
such experiences often bring to the fore base human instincts
that exalt higher authority and the tendency to adapt instantly
to new patterns of behavior. Similar problems affected the
officer corps of the US Army in the wake of the Korean and
Vietnam wars, when many officers promoted in combat could no
longer survive the rigors of a peacetime army that requires the
skills of finding one's way in the more static world of a
garrison force. The syndrome of an opportunistic overeagerness to
fit in could provoke unhappiness not only in the Bundeswehr-Ost
candidate intent on a permanent position, but among his comrades
in Bundeswehr-East and -West suspicious of opportunists. The
leadership of the Bundeswehr responsible for policy on Innere
Fuehrung recognized this problem at the outset as a threat to
cohesiveness. They set about through an attentive personnel
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policy and an emphasis on education and training to meet it as
best they could. This writer's contact with veterans of the NVA
also suggests that among these men there are many who are quite
prepared and capable of effectively making such a difficult
transition of mentality and outlook.
The present danger of two camps recalls the difficulties of
Innere Fuehrung in its first decades, as certain veterans of the
Reichswehr and Wehrmacht adapted to the reforms only amid great
friction and protest in the 'fifties and 'sixties. But with the
passage of time and the evolution of society after 1968, these
camps made peace all the same. The Bundeswehr leadership
recognizes that there can exist a diversity of opinions on
certain political and social issues within the officer corps as
there is in society at large. This successful process of
integration of diversity within the military forms an important
example of the intellectual-political foundations of the
Bundeswehr that have been a prominent features of this essay.
The tension between the requirements of military
effectiveness and the imperatives of democracy long plagued
German politics and society. The disaster of National Socialism
exacerbated this long-standing problem and required military
reform c nee Germany began to rearm in the nineteen-f if ties. A
nascent Federal Republic of Germany and an untested Bundeswehr
forged a new soldierly ethos for the veterans of the Wehrmacht in
the first two decades of the new army. This enterprise proceeded
under the suspicious gaze of a world worried that the veterans of
Hitler's armies would once more sow the dragon's teeth of an army
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of aggression. All too many believed at the birth of the
Bundeswehr that Prussian-German militarism was integral to the
German character. The founders of the Bundeswehr proved these
assumptions to be quite false. They carried the ideals of the
Basic Law into the barracks; they anchored the new army in
domestic German politics and made the Bundeswehr an institution
of the elected representatives of the West German people; the
founders fitted the Bundeswehr into NATO to win the trust and
confidence of the western allies. The German Democietic Republic,
in contrast, borrowed the political mechanisms of the Red Army
and the ideal of blind discipline as the foundation stones of the
NVA. These building blocks collapsed, not the least because they
belonged to the epoch of the two world wars and its political
ideologies, all of which is now passing into oblivion. A mature
Federal Republic and a durable Bundeswehr must now adapt to the
experience and expectations of the NVA veteran, mindful of the
failures of the German past that warn against an unbalanced
relationship between army and democracy. The Bundeswehr must
restore the NVA veteran' s faith in the efficacy of civilian
control of the military while giving him a chance to continue in
his chosen profession.
This military union, however, affects more than merely
Germany itself. Events in 1990-1991 beyond Germany's borders
suggested that the requirement of 1955 to fashion "a good army, a
good democracy, and a balanced relationship between the two"
concerns Europe as a whole. A continent struggling to unite in
the wake of the cold war still faces the scourge of a violent
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nationalism that all too painfully recalls the close of the
nineteenth century and the era between the world wars. Former
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevradnaze' s startling
resignation speech of December 1990, with its reference to "baby
colonels in oversized shoulder-boards," pointed to the danger of
militarism arising from the failure of communism. Political
observers feared that turmoil in certain states of the collapsed
Soviet empire might once more open the door to military
dictatorship.
This danger added greater importance to the series of
seminars on the political foundations of the West German military
begun by the Bundeswehr for officers from certain eastern
European countries. Although the founders of the Bundeswehr long
described Innere Fuehrung as "not being an item for export," the
events of 1989-1990 aroused interest in Germany's eastern
neighbors for the ideal of the "citizen in uniform." Such
exchange between the soldiers of Germany and its neighbors augurs
well for the general attempt to heal the wounds of a divided
Europe. In this sense, the union of Bundeswehr-West and
Bundeswehr-East constitutes a test case of the general problems
confronting the European security system. The West German
military reform, begun in the wake of a disastrous defeat, has
entered into a new and extraordinary phase; despite the
dislocations and setbacks that must perforce come with a German
military union, nonetheless, the record of the past justifies
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